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Air evacuation of patients with potentially
lethal, contagious infections poses unique
challenges and risks to air crews and medical
personnel. Evacuation of such patients is
relevant to military contingency operations
because troops may be placed at risk for
hemorrhagic fevers and other infections during
deployment to tropical environments or by
adversaries use of biological warfare agents.
Evacuation of patients to the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Dis-
eases (USAMRIID) would afford the immediate
availability of biosafety level 4 laboratories
(designed for the study of pathogens requiring
maximum biological containment for laboratory
safety) and facilitate rapid diagnosis of diseases
due to pathogens posing extraordinary labora-
tory safety hazards. Furthermore, USAMRIID
has the only fixed patient-care suite in the world
designed for medical care under maximum
biological containment. To safely evacuate a
limited number of patients to the containment-
care suite and provide medical care while
minimizing the risk for transmission to air
crews, caregivers, and civilians, USAMRIID
maintains an aeromedical isolation team (1-3).
The Aeromedical Isolation Team
The purpose of the isolation team is to safely
transport patients with potentially lethal
communicable diseases for which no effective
vaccines, chemoprophylaxis, or specific thera-
pies exist. These would include patients with an
unknown disease pending identification of the
pathogen, patients with viral hemorrhagic
fevers (notably those due to filoviruses and
arenaviruses), and those suspected of being
affected by a biological attack (Table 1) (3).
Etiologic diagnosis and medical care would be
provided at USAMRIID.
USAMRIID can simultaneously deploy two
teams, each consisting of one physician, one
registered nurse, and four to six medics. Each
team can transport and manage one patient. In
addition, the team can deploy a portable
containment laboratory with rapid diagnostic
Military contingency operations in tropical environments and potential use of
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Table 1. Infections and conditions requiring containment
care during transport
Arenavirus infection
Argentine hemorrhagic fever (Junin virus)
Bolivian hemorrhagic fever (Machupo virus)
Brazilian hemorrhagic fever (Sabiá virus)
Lassa fever
Venezuelan hemorrhagic fever (Guanarito
  virus)
Bunyavirus infection
Congo-Crimean hemorrhagic fever
Filovirus infection
Ebola
Marburg
Orthopoxvirus infection
Monkeypox
Variola
Pneumonic plague until sputum cultures are
   negative
Any unknown, virulent, communicable disease
   pending diagnosis
Suspected biological-warfarecaused infection
Figure 1: Aeromedical isolation team members in
field-protective suits equipped with battery-powered
HEPA-filtered respirators transporting the stretcher
isolator, a light-weight unit designed for initial
patient retrieval. The team trains on several types of
military aircraft, including the C-130 transport
shown in the background.
assays, including enzyme-linked immunosorbent
assays and polymerase chain reaction (PCR), as
well as standard clinical laboratory support, for
all agents listed in Table 1 (in development:
Machupo, Sabiá, and Guanarito viruses).
Deployable on rotary and fixed-wing military
aircraft, the team conducts in-flight training and
can deploy within 6 to 12 hours of notification.
Although a military asset, the team has been
mobilized for situations involving civilians.
Requests may be forwarded through local and
state health departments to the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, through the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, or
through the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
are then reviewed by the Directorate of Military
Support. Evacuation of non-U.S. citizens from
other countries to the United States would
require coordination through the Department of
State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.
Biosafety Containment under Field
Conditions
Maximum biological containment is de-
signed  to prevent transmission of highly
hazardous pathogens and is accomplished in two
steps. First, the health-care worker wears an
impermeable suit consisting of a lightweight
polyvinyl chloride (PVC) coverall, a separate
hood, and vinyl boots (Figure 1). A HEPA-filtered
respirator powered by a rechargeable battery
supplies air under positive pressure for
breathing and cooling. HEPA filters are certified
to remove 99.7% of particles 0.03  µm to 3.0 µm
diameter; each filter is tested with particulate
aerosol challenge studies before delivery. Air
enters at a rate of 170 L/min through an intake
port near the top of the hood and exits through an
exhaust valve at its base. Two-way radios permit
communication between team members and
patients. The suit and respirator ensemble has
been tested by the manufacturer by particulate
aerosol challenge and meets the standards of the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration for working in environments
with respiratory hazards.
Second, the patient is isolated within a
sealed container under negative air pressure
maintained by a battery-powered HEPA-filtered
ventilation system providing five air exchanges
per hour (Figure 1). Two isolators are used: the
stretcher isolator, a lightweight unit for initial
patient retrieval (Figure 1), and the Vickers
aircraft transport isolator (VATI), a larger unit
for definitive transport and in-flight care (Figure
2; Table 2).
The design and construction of the isolators
are similar to that of transparent flexible PVC
isolators for gnotobiotic animals in biomedical
research; the isolators were adapted both for in-
patient and transport use (4-7). Challenge
studies have demonstrated the efficacy of
containing aerosolized T-2 bacteriophage during243 Vol. 5, No. 2, AprilJune 1999 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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Figure 2: The Vickers aircraft transport isolator
(VATI), designed for prolonged patient transporta-
tion and in-flight care.
Table 2.  Dimensions of portable isolators
Length Width Height Weight
Isolator    (cm)   (cm)   (cm)    (kg)
Stretcher 221 69   86   45
Vickers 221 91 152 112
  aircraft
  transport
Figure 3: Patients view of an aeromedical isolation
team member providing care through a half-suit in
the Vickers aircraft transport isolator (VATI).
both hypobaric and isobaric conditions (8). The
HEPA filters are certified to remove 99.7% of all
particles 0.3  µm to 3  µm in diameter. Isolators
have been used to treat in-patients with
suspected Ebola, Lassa, and Marburg hemor-
rhagic fevers (5,6). The utility and safety of these
isolators for in-patient care have been ques-
tioned (9), and their use in hospitals is not
recommended (10,11). However, transport isola-
tors, the only available technical means of
reliably maintaining airborne isolation in a
military transport aircraft, have been success-
fully used for the aeromedical evacuation of
patients with suspected Ebola fever (6) and
suspected (7) and proven Lassa fever (9).
Both isolators feature transparent PVC
envelopes suspended from metal frames by
detachable plastic rings. Both envelopes include
gloved sleeves, transfer and docking ports for
patient entry, and transfer and supply ports for
introducing supplies. Electrical current is
supplied by rechargeable batteries or the aircraft
electrical system. Both isolators can be equipped
with portable oxygen tanks, intravenous fluids
and tubing, medication, and portable
defibrillators.
Aeromedical Evacuation Process
The patient must be evaluated and stabilized
before transport to ensure survival en route.
Only patients likely to survive transport would
be evacuated. The physiologic effects of altitude,
effect of confinement on patient-care delivery,
and psychologic effect of confinement within the
isolator must be considered. Mechanical ventila-
tion cannot be provided in the VATI, and suction
capabilities are limited; therefore, acute respira-
tory failure and presence of gas trapped within
closed body cavities that may pressurize at high
altitudes (e.g., pneumothorax or intestinal gas
due to ileus or bowel obstruction) contraindicate
evacuation. Evacuation of patients with condi-
tions requiring special in-flight management,
e.g., hemodynamic instabilty and severe anemia
(<2.5 million erythrocytes/cc or <7.0 g hemoglo-
bin/100 ml) (12), may also be contraindicated.
The patient is placed inside the stretcher
isolator and carried to a transfer point near the
aircraft. There the stretcher isolator and team
members are decontaminated with a 5%
hypochlorite solution. During the decontamina-
tion procedure, the patient breathes portable
oxygen from a mask, and the ventilation intake
port is sealed to prevent chlorine gas from
entering the isolator. The portals of the isolators
are then connected with an airtight sleeve, and
the patient is transferred to the VATI (Figure 3).
The sleeve is clamped at two points before being
heat-sealed and cut, maintaining air-tight seals
throughout the transfer. The cut ends are
decontaminated and covered with PVC seals,
which are then attached to the isolators with244 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 5, No. 2, AprilJune 1999
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pressure-sensitive tape. Both isolators are
maintained under negative air pressure until
decontaminated at USAMRIID. Equipment is
removed, placed in bags, and returned to
USAMRIID for decontamination of respirators
and radios and disposal or decontamination of
coveralls.
The patient is transported on standard
military transport aircraft (C-130 or C-141),
which maintain an internal cabin atmosphere
equivalent to approximately 8,000 feet above sea
level while at altitude (26,000 feet to 35,000 feet).
This level of air pressure is considered adequate
to protect commercial airline passengers (13) and
results in an arterial blood hemoglobin oxygen
saturation of approximately 90% in healthy
persons. However, because the VATI maintains
negative air pressure, the partial pressure of
oxygen inside the VATI is lower than that of
ambient atmosphere. This lower pressure would
be hazardous for persons with respiratory failure
or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. In
addition, rapid decompression could place the
patient at further risk. Accordingly, the VATI is
deployed with portable oxygen tanks, tubing,
and masks capable of delivering 100% of needed
oxygen.
Design features of the VATI that facilitate in-
flight care include its larger size, additional glove
ports, two half-suits, 12 cones at the base of the
envelope for introducing wires and tubing, two
sleeves for intravenous therapy, and two large
pockets for placing waste supplies.
Diagnosis and therapy, which can be
delivered in the VATI, include monitoring
cardiac function, blood-pressure, and oxygen
saturation of the blood; providing oxygen
supplementation, intravenous therapy, and
phlebotomy; and determining hemoglobin and
hematocrit levels and serum electrolytes (by
using a portable hand-held laboratory analyzer)
(Figure 3). Because the use of glove ports limits
manual dexterity, team members practice these
skills on each other during on-ground and in-
flight training exercises. Endotracheal intuba-
tion, manual ventilatory assistance with a bag
and valve device, and cardiopulmonary resusci-
tation are practiced on mannequins in the
isolators. To minimize the risk of puncturing
the isolator, no glass bottles or instruments
with rough or sharp edges are used.
Phlebotomy is minimized, and a needleless
intravenous system is used.
After arriving at USAMRIID, the patient is
transferred from the VATI into the containment-
care suite through a plastic sleeve connected to a
port on an outside wall.
 Aeromedical Isolation Team Deployments
The first of several team deployments
occurred during the October 1989 epizootic of
Ebola hemorrhagic fever among cynomolgus
monkeys (Maccaca fascicularis) imported from
the Philippines and held at a primate quarantine
facility in Reston, Virginia (14-16). Because
Ebola virus had been isolated only in association
with epidemics of human disease in Africa,
which had death rates of 53% to 88%, potential
transmission of Ebola to animal handlers in the
facility and secondary transmission to other
members of the community were of concern.
Aeromedical isolation team and additional
personnel from USAMRIID were deployed.
Animal handlers were trained in the use of suits
and respirators, containment methods, decon-
tamination, and waste disposal; 450 monkeys
were humanely euthanized; and team members
obtained specimens of blood and tissue for
histopathologic and virologic studies and sealed
and decontaminated the facility by paraformal-
dehyde fumigation followed by conventional
disinfectants (16).
Respiratory transmission was suggested by
the epizootic spread among monkeys housed in
separate cages (with no opportunity for physical
contact [16]) and by subclinical human
infections. Serologic evidence of recent Ebola
infection developed in four of the five animal
handlers; only one had percutaneous blood
exposure. None became ill, which suggested that
the epizootic strain was not virulent for humans
(17), and none of the 42 USAMRIID personnel
participating became infected. The Ebola isolates
from infected primates represented a newly
described strain, Ebola Reston, genetically and
taxonomically distinct from related human
pathogens identified in Africa.
In another episode, an aeromedical isolation
team member was deployed to Linkoping,
Sweden, in January 1990 to assist in
implementing biosafety containment for a
patient suspected of having a viral hemorrhagic
fever after returning from eastern Africa (1).
During November 1995, the team was
deployed with a senior medical advisor after
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Force Base, near Dayton, Ohio, uncovered a
buried cache of biological munitions. Some of the
munitions, produced during the U.S. offensive
biological warfare program (19421969) (18),
were intact, but most were perforated due to
corrosion of the munition casings. The munitions
were brought inside a bunker by the U.S. Army
Technical Escort Unit and sampled inside the
VATI. Samples of liquid bomb fill and adjacent
soil samples were transported in sealed
containers on ice packs in accordance with U.S.
Department of Transportation regulations by
military aircraft to USAMRIID, the Naval
Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Mary-
land, and the Armed Forces Institute of
Pathology, Washington, D.C. The bomb fill
contained nonviable gram-negative bacteria
(identified as Brucella suis by strain-specific
PCR); soil samples tested positive for Brucella
DNA and antigens and cultures yielded normal
commensal flora but no growth of Brucella sp.
Background soil and groundwater tested
negative for Brucella DNA and antigens. All
munitions were drained, and the fill and casings
were sterilized by autoclave before disposal.
Documents later retrieved confirmed that the
munitions were bomblets filled with B. suis and
used at the base from June to October 1954 to
train personnel in viability testing and handling
of biological weapons. After training was
completed, the munitions were heated in a ground
portable heater with an ambient temperature of
104°C for 4 hours each of 2 days, with the
temperatures of the innermost munitions
reaching 70°C to 74°C, and then buried.
Although not deployed, the team was on alert
during 1994 for a laboratory-acquired Sabiá
virus infection (Brazilian hemorrhagic fever) at
Yale University (19) and during the 1995 Ebola
epidemic in the former Zaire.
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